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Infrastructure Politics: The 
Dynamics of Crossing San 
Francisco Bay 
SY ADLER 
Introduction 
In 1945 it was obvious to virtually everyone in the San Francisco Bay 
Area that the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge would soon be hope- 
lessly congested. Opened to motor vehicle traffic in 1936, the bridge was a 
huge tratic and financial success. Financing for this monumental public 
work was provided by Herbert Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corpora- 
tion (RFC), which bought the first $62 million of toll-secured revenue 
bonds in late 1932. The project was one of Hoover's personal favorites. 
The Great Engineer had been associated with the location studies done 
for the bridge in the late 1920s. Because it was one of RFC's earliest and 
largest efforts to create employment during the darkest depression days, 
the president hoped it would prove a political as well as an engineering 
triumph. 1 
The history of efforts to deal with the Bay Bridge problem provides case 
material for developing atheory of the politics of transport infrastructure 
projects. There are two primary analytical dimensions. One is the influ- 
ence of urban rivalry on all aspects of infrastructure planning and imple- 
mentation. The second concerns the circumstances that permit rivalry- 
induced political stalemates to be broken. 
1. Hoover-Young San Francisco Bay Bridge Commission, Report (1930), n.p; J. Olson, 
Herbert Hoover and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 1931-1933 (Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1977). 
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Urban Rivalry and Infrastructure Politics 
As Christine Rosen notes in a study of nineteenth-century urban public 
works, "infrastructural development, by its very nature, usually benefited 
some people more than others or benefited some people while hurting 
others."2 The inherently uneven distribution ofproject benefits, particu- 
larly those of transport projects, across pace and over time creates loca- 
tion advantages for some places and disadvantages others. Since capital in 
the United States is mobile, places are continuously competing with one 
another to maintain and attract capital investment. This basic feature of 
the U. S. urban development process ofien gives rise, therefore, to coali- 
tions of place-rooted investors, which form to defend and advance local 
interests. Infrastructure projects are inevitably strategic weapons in the 
hands of these coalitions, which seek to deploy them in order to gain 
location advantages. Competing coalitions try to use infrastructure proj- 
ects to shape development, rather than simply to respond to existing 
demand forces.3 
Urban rivalry, then, produces controversy regarding all aspects of proj- 
ect planning and implementation. The most coIltroversial projects are 
metropolitan-scale facilities that will concentrate benefits in one place or 
in a small number of places that are jointly pursuing location advantage. 
Given the relative responsiveness of political structures at all United 
States government levels to local concerns, controversy may produce 
stalemate, as local coalitions within the same metropolitan region collide 
in their efforts to defend and advance their interests. 
Transcending Stalemate 
This study analyzes the possibilities and limits of three ways around 
stalemate. One is through consensus-building. Consensus i achievable if
individual projects can be designed and financed in a disaggregated way, 
both spatially and temporally, so that the development aspirations of 
many competing places can be served. The contents of the package reflect 
the relative political strengths of the participants inthe process. Classical 
pork barrel politics are a species of consensus-building. 
The second way around stalemate is through a claim of political and 
military priority public interest which can be used either to support a 
2. C. Rosen, "Infrastructural Improvement in Nineteenth-Century Cities: A Conceptual 
Framework and Cases,"Journal of Urban History 12 (May 1986), 249. 
3. N. Fainstein and S. Fainstein, "Regime Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Eco- 
nomic Forces," in S. Fainstein, N. Fainstein, R. Hill, D. Judd, and M. Smith, Restructuring 
the City (New York: Longman, 1983), 245-82; D. Harvey, "The Place of Urban Politics in 
the Geography of Uneven Capitalist Development," in D. Harvey, The Urbanization of 
Capital (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-64; P. Peterson, City 
Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
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project or to oppose one advanced by a competitor. Such a claim aims at 
silencing opposition, thereby protecting projects from challenge by disad- 
vantaged coalitions. The argument is straightforward: projects that will 
contribute substantially topolitical and economic stability or military pre- 
paredness must override narrow self-interested concerns of individual 
localities. In the public works field) political and military claims have 
historically been crucial in legitimating overnment action. The French 
national government saw fit to subsidize Haussmann's reconstruction of
central Paris primarily because of such considerations, and public works 
spending has since been linked with governmental concern over unem- 
ployment-caused political instability.4 Ironically, project sponsors have 
often been constrained as a result of this linkage, coming into conflict with 
government officials eeking to regulate public works pending solely in 
relation to stabilization concerns. 
The third way around stalemate is through access to financial capital. 
Haussmann, once again, worked closely with Parisian financiers, and Rob- 
ert Moses forged long-lasting alliances with New York bond market partici- 
pants.5 Like a claim of political or military priority, an access claim serves 
to protect particular projects from challenges brought by competitors. 
The relatively autonomous governmental gencies often created to fi- 
nance and build irlfrastructure utilized by Moses and others to great 
advantage, further einforce the protection enjoyed by favored projects. 
All three of these ways around stalemate were tried during the thirteen- 
year-long effort to deal with Bay Bridge congestion. Consensus-buildirlg 
was the objective of the Bay Area Council (BAC), the regional corporate- 
elite policy planning group. BAC was formed in an effort to get the 
region7s big business leadership to organize itself for the competitive 
struggle ahead. As Francis V. Keesling, chairman of BAC's executive 
committee told a conference discussing peacetime reconversion issues, 
"What we are trying to do is to solidify the Bay Area against he inroads 
which Los Angeles might make. We want to protect ourselves against he 
activities of the South, and I take my hat oW to them for they are certaiIlly 
doing a job." BAC was the only functioning regional organization i the 
Bay Area, with committees operating in each of the nine counties compris- 
ing the region.6 
Traffic and transportation issues were crucial for the council. It saw a 
need for huge amounts of transportation infrastructure to accomodate Bay 
Area population and economic growth. The concern was that insufficient 
4. J. Garraty, Unemployment in History (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); A. Sutcliffe? 
The Autumn of Central Paris (London: Edward Arnold, 1970). 
5. D. Harvey, "Paris, 18S0-1870," in D. Harvey, Corlsciousness and the Urban Experi- 
ence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 63-220; A. Walsh, The Public's 
Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1978). 
6. F.V. Keesling Papers, Box 21, Folder 183, 10/17/45. Stanford University Library; M. 
Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). 
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transport capacity would "strangle" the region, "choking off' potential 
growth, driving business elsewhere, and causing the regional economy to 
"stagnate" and then decline. BAC developed numerous plans and propos- 
als intended to generate consensus regarding united region-wide action. 
During the cold war 1940s and 1950s rival places filled the air with 
political and military priority claims, continuing a strategy that Bay Area 
place-coalitions had developed following World War I. Roger Lotchin 
notes that the Bay Area emerged as a metropolitan-military complex in 
the 1920s, as the region sought military resources in order to stimulate 
regional economic growth. Lotchin emphasizes rivalry between San Fran- 
cisco and Los Angeles as the spur to Bay Area militarization, a strategy 
that virtually all organized groups in San Francisco supported. At the 
same time, the navy was suffering in inter-service rivalries, and was seek- 
ing civilian friends. During this period the Bay Area learned to trumpet 
the defense rationale in order to unify the region and to generate support 
for increased military spending. 7 
The downtown San Francisco financial community played a central role 
in the infrastructure planning process. Annmarie Walsh notes that "the 
principles of the bond market insist that financial considerations should 
determine policy." An important consequence of this central role played 
by private financial capital, Walsh argues, is that highway projects are 
favored over commuter ail transportation, because of the profitability of 
the former and the fiscal incapacity of the latter.8 Finance capital institu- 
tions, however, have both a general interest in underwriting infrastruc- 
ture projects, as well as investments rooted in particular places. Walsh 
doesn't attribute spatial concerns to bond market participants that might 
be reflected in support for rail rapid transit. In the Bay Area, downtown 
San Francisco financiers chose to grant access to a metropolitan-scale 
commuter rail project Bay Area Rapid Transit (BARTArather than to a 
bridge/highway facility in order to deal with Bay Bridge congestion. 
While this particular way around stalemate was eventually the one 
charted, it was as controversial sthe others. A unified regional program 
for the Bay Area remained highly problematic. 
Bay Area Rivalrzes and San Francisco Bay Crossings 
The original Bay Bridge project was handled by RFC's Self-Liquidating 
Division. RFC was interested in financing only those projects which were 
certain ot to default on their interest and principal payments. Insistence 
on financial soundness flowed directly from RFC's orientation asprimarily 
a banker's organization.9 It demanded several conditions intended to 
7. R. Lotchin, '4The City and the Sword: San Francisco and the Rise of the Metropolitan- 
Military Complex 1919-1941," Journal of American History 65 (March 1979), 996-1020. 
8. A. Walsh, The Public's Business, 338. 
9. J. Olson, Herbert Hoover and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
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minimize and protect the federal government's financial commitment. 
Among these were requirements hat the California legislature vote the 
funds for building the approaches to the bridge and also approve paying 
the operating, maintenance, and insurance costs for the structure out of 
state highway funds rather than from tolls. 10 
The state legislature reluctantly agreed to these terms, but the result- 
ing combination of state and federal fiscal conservatism caused the con- 
struction of a more cramped Bay Bridge than a less cautious financial 
arrangement might have allowed. Approaches to the structure were very 
limited on both the San Francisco and East Bay sides, and the traffic lanes 
on the bridge were narrow. The double-decked span carried automobile 
traffic on the upper level. The lower deck carried commercial vehicles and 
the Bridge Railway, which consisted of two sets of tracks running directly 
into a Transbay Transit Terminal located on the fringe of the San Fran- 
cisco central business district. 11 
Bridge rail patronage was, however, very disappointing, falling well 
below expectations. Designed to carry fifty million people per year, and 
seventeen thousand uring the peak twenty-minute period, in 1941 the 
rails handled just fourteen million. Even during the war, when automo- 
bile traffic was constrained, twenty-seven million were transported during 
the peak year of 1945, just fifty-four percent of capacity. In only one year, 
1945, were Bridge Railway toll revenues ufficient to meet even the inter- 
est costs on the rail portion of the bridge, necessitating a subsidy from 
auto users. 12 
In October 1945, the California Toll Bridge Authority (CTBA), the 
state-created agency that built and managed the structure, approved a
study to be made by the Department of Public Works (DPW) of an 
additional crossing of San Francisco Bay. The CTBA action was supported 
and encouraged by numerous business, labor, and civic groups, led by the 
recently created Bay Area Council. 13
The main protagonists on the bay crossing issue were the cities of San 
Francisco and Oakland, although the rest of the region would become 
involved in the conflict. There were two major points of contention. First, 
San Francisco wanted to see mainline transcontiIlental r ilroad tracks 
included on the next crossing. A low-level structure would be required to 
support mainline trains at acceptable grades. The major ail freight and 
10. California Division of San Francisco Bay Toll Crossings (hereafter SBTC), A Report 
to Department of Public Works on Additional Toll Crossings of San Francisco Bay, 1948, 
n.p; California Toll Bridge Authority (hereafter CTBA), Transcript of meeting, November 
27, l9Sl. California State Archive, Sacramento. 
11. SBTC, A Report to Department of Public Works on Additional Toll Crossings of San 
Francisco Bay; California Railroad Commission, Report on Survey of Interurban Passenger 
Transportation Between San Francisco and East Bay Cities via the San Francisco-Oakland 
Bay Bridge, Vsolume 4, Part 1, 1941, n.p. 
12. SBTC, A Report to Department of Public Works on Additional Toll Crossings of San 
Francisco Bay. 
13 CTBA, Transcript of Meeting, October 3, 1945. 
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passenger terminals were on the Oakland side of the bay; San Francisco 
business, labor, and political leaders wanted to bring rail traffic directly 
into the city. Downtown Oakland leaders opposed this effort to divert 
traffic. Downtown Oakland saw the central issue as the immediate relief of 
existing motor vehicle traffic ongestion. A high-level structure near the 
Bay Bridge in the established transbay travel corridor appeared to offer 
the best prospect of accomplishing this goal. 
San Francisco argued this was too narrow aview, reflecting short-term 
thinking. The need was for long-term planning to accommodate fiture 
Bay Area growth. Industry and people were moving south, down the 
peninsula nd into southern Alameda County. (Oakland was in northern 
Alameda County. ) The goals of relieving congestion on the existing bridge 
and serving future development, San Francisco claimed, would best be 
served by a crossing in a location several miles south of the present 
bridgeheads. Such a southerly location would also provide the conditions 
necessary for a railroad-supporting low-level structure. Moreover, since 
the existing Bay Bridge approaches were limited traffic entering San 
Francisco from the East Bay was soon flowing on the city streets, as was 
traffic heading from the peninsula to the northeast. If a southern crossing 
were available then this through traffic could be removed from the 
streets, freeing the space for central city-oriented movements. 
The San Francisco Labor Council consistently supported a southern 
crossing, reflecting a concern with the future of industrial production 
within the city. Manufacturing firms were concentrated along the city's 
bayshore in the vicinity of a southern crossing. A southern crossing would 
facilitate freight ransport between San Francisco's manufacturing district 
and related firms in the East Bay, as well as improve travel conditions 
between working-class residential areas in the southeastern sector of the 
city and industrial production zones in southern Alameda County. 
San Francisco fficials were also deeply concerned with the possible 
negative impacts of a parallel bridge on downtown traffic problems. The 
two bridges would channel an increasing volume of traffic through the 
city's central core. Technical nd political leaders argued that an elaborate 
and extremely expensive network of approach and downtown freeway 
distribution structures would be required to protect downtown streets 
from paralyzing congestion. The city leadership was distressed at the 
prospect of locally financing these expensive structures. The East Bay 
would not likely favor including these costly structures as part of the 
bridge project. DPW would also likely be concerned with the effect of 
including the structures on the project's financial feasibility. 14 
Oakland sought o protect its competitive position as a regional center 
14. Citizens Postwar Planning Committee, Report to Mayor Roger Lapham, 1945, n.p.; 
E. E. Robinson, The Case for the Southern Crossing, Brief of testimony introduced before 
the Assembly Committee on Tidelands and Related Problems at its hearing in Sacramento, 
1949, n. p; San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Journal, February 117 1946. 
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and to secure its dominant position in the East Bay against San Francisco 
designs. Oakland wanted southern Alameda County's growing population 
to focus on Oakland, not San Francisco. Another bridge in the existing 
transbay traffic orridor would facilitate further esidential development 
in those parts of Alameda nd Contra Costa Counties close to Oakland. 
Perhaps many of these people would commute to San Francisco to work, 
but Oakland would be closer for shopping and other activities. 
The dynamics of political and military claims: Part 1(1949-1952). San 
Francisco leaders were concerned that DPW shared the Oakland view 
that the only legitimate issue involved was the immediate relief of existing 
bridge traffic ongestion. 15 Therefore, San Francisco asked one of its U. S. 
congressional representatives to seek a study by the national military 
establishment. 
In March 1946, Richard Welch introduced a measure in the House 
Naval Affairs Committee to have the Navy and War Departments ake up 
the problem. In 1941 Welch had unsuccessfully sought a southern cross- 
ing as a civil defense measure in order to evacuate the city. 16 In April the 
full House approved aresolution creating aJoint Army-Navy Investigative 
Board (JANB). The navy was cool to the subject. The military had studied 
the question of additional crossings in 1941 and concluded that increased 
capacity was not necessary for defense purposes. President Truman, how- 
ever, was said to be favorably disposed to the study. Congressman Welch 
told an appreciative San Francisco Board of Supervisors that any plan for a 
second crossing should include railroad tracks. Oakland Mayor Herbert 
Beach condemned Welch, saying he would oppose any low-level struc- 
ture that would blockade the Oakland Port. The Oakland Chamber of 
Commerce stood behirld their mayor, attacking this blatant move to steer 
traffic into San Francisco. 17
The Joint Army-Navy Board came to the Bay Area to conduct public 
hearings during the summer of 1946. The San Francisco delegation to the 
board was led by Supervisor Marvin Lewis, who had staked out the 
transportation area as one of his main governmental concerns. The San 
Frarlcisco supervisors ent Lewis to the board hearings armed with a 
unanimously adopted Lewis-sponsored resolution stating that the best 
interests of San Francisco called for a mainline railroad connection to a 
Union Depot over any second bay crossing. Lewis reported back how 
proud he was that San Francisco had been able to present a united front 
on the need for trains; downtown interests, labor groups, and improve- 
ment clubs all supported the position. Lewis also noted Oaklandys ex- 
pressec . opposition. 
1S. San Francisco Chronicle, April 2, 1946; San Francisco News, May 2, 1946. 
16. R. Lotchin, 'The City and the Sword: San Francisco and the Rise of the Metropol- 
itan-Military Complex 1919-1941." 
17. Berkeley Gazette, March 15, 1946; San Francisco Daily Commercial News, May 1, 
1946; Alumeda Times, June 1, 1946. 
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Alliance possibilities were emerging on the issue, however. Cities in 
southern Alameda County were breaking with Oakland on the bridge 
location question, and agreeing with San Francisco on the advantages ofa 
southern crossing. Moreover, San Mateo County was likewise interested 
in additional transport capacity closer to San Mateo. The Oakland-sup- 
ported crossing would be less desirable for peninsula cities so they were 
lining up with San Francisco as well. 18 
On January 25, 1947, JANB reported its findings. The board proposed 
the immediate construction ofa southern crossing of San Francisco Bay, 
but found there wasn't any need for railroad tracks on the structure. The 
board had directly questioned the major ail carriers on this question. 
They had all unequivocally denied any interest in extending their passen- 
ger facilities in the Bay Area. The board agreed that a southern location 
would best facilitate future regional growth. They also noted that while 
there wasn't any need for an additional crossing from a national defense 
standpoint, security precautions dictated that bridge structures be dis- 
persed to decrease their vulnerability oenemy attack. The military engi- 
neers also pointed out that a parallel crossing close to the existing one 
would have a harmful effect on downtown San Francisco, worsening traffic 
congestion there. This was crucial because the relative ability of crossings 
to enable peak hour commuters to get into and out of the San Francisco 
central business district was a major location criterion. 
The Army-Navy Board surprised everyone with a companion recom- 
mendation to its call for a southern crossing. They broadened their field of 
vision to consider transit issues in relation to motor vehicle traffic and told 
the Bay Area that it would be impossible continually toconstruct highway 
crossings and related parking facilities. At some point automotive conges- 
tion would become so severe that the area would be forced to increase its 
use of transit. The board proposed that the Bay Area begin to plan now for 
this eventuality. They noted that extensive rail capacity was already avail- 
able, but was seriously underutilized. This, the board argued, was be- 
cause the existing service, supplied by the privately-owned Key System, 
was very poor. The solution was a fially integrated rail rapid transit service 
using grade-separated xclusive rights-of-way in San Francisco and the 
East Bay, and an underwater tube to make the connection. The board 
even went so far as to consult with various tunnel and other transit engi- 
neering experts on a tentative plan of routes and estimated costs for such a 
rail system. The total cost came in at $208 million, with the centerpiece 
tube costing $74 million. Constructing a tube had an additional benefit: 
18. San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Journal, February 11, 1946, July 15, 1946, 
August 19, 1946; Bay Region Business, August 13, 1946; East Bay Supporters for the South- 
ern Crossing, The Case for the Southern Crossing of San Francisco Bay. Presented to 
California Toll Bridge Authority, 1946, n. p. 
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the existing Bridge Railway could be abandoned and paved, thereby in- 
creasing Bay Bridge motor vehicle capacity. 19 
This transit proposal did not create much of an immediate stir, how- 
ever. San Francisco was pleased with the location decision, but still 
wanted those transcontinental railroad trains. Oakland was upset at the 
choice of location. The transit idea receded further into the background 
when the state Department of Public Works reported its findings just a 
few days later. DPW recommended immediate construction ofan identi- 
cal bridge parallel to and three hundred feet north of the existing struc- 
ture. Traffie and revenue studies done for DPW by the consulting firm of 
Coverdale and Colpitts (who had done the same kinds of studies for the 
original Bay Bridge project) indicated that this parallel crossing was the 
most likely to divert enough traffic from the existing bridge to make it a 
sound financial investment. Moreover, existing rail facilities were consid- 
ered adequate for transit ravel. 20
The conflicting reports purred feverish activity all around the bay. In 
Oakland the City Council, Chamber of Commerce, and Real Estate Board 
declared their allegiance to the parallel bridge. The southern Alameda 
County cities organized the Committee for a Southern Crossing over San 
Francisco Bay and agitated for their choice. San Francisco got Congress- 
man Welch to intervene with the secretaries of the army and navy asking 
them to delay their final report until additional studies could be made of 
the costs of including railroad tracks on a crossing. The Bay Area Council 
appointed aTransportation a d Traffic Committee to attempt reconcilia- 
tion. Finally, DPW undertook a second look at the issues. 21 
In late August 1947, the secretaries of the army and navy released their 
final report. They agreed with JANB in all particulars, including the 
transcontinental railroad question; no train tracks were warranted on a 
southern crossing.22 
BAC's Traffic and Transportation Committee dissented, voting 18-6 in 
favor of a parallel bridge. The majority argued that relief of congestion on 
the existing bridge was the chief priority, and a parallel bridge would 
accomplish this more cheaply and effectively than a southern crossing. 
Regarding the transit proposal, the committee majority pointed out that 
the cost of the tube alone was estimated at $74 million and the total 
project at $208 million. The committee "believed that the difficulties of 
organizing and firlancing such a system within the near future would be 
insurmountable, and in view of the other great needs of the communities 
19. Joint Army-Navy Board, An Additional Crossing of San Francisco Bay, 1947, n.p. 
20. San Francisco Examiner, February 17, 1947; California Department of Public 
Works, Preliminary Studies for an Additional Crossing of San Francisco Bay, 1947, n.p. 
21. Bay Region Business, February 6, 1947; San Francisco Examiner, February 18, 1947; 
San Francisco Chronicle, August 28, 1947; Oakland Tribune, September 19, 1947. 
22. San Francisco Chronicle, August 28, 1947. 
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that it would be better to postp(Jl-le such an undertaking, at least until such 
time as existing facilities are overtaxed."23 The BAC Board of Governors, 
however, refused to take a vote on the recommendations submitted by its 
Trafflc and Transportation Committee. Even though the committee had 
produced aclear majority, the issues were so intensely controversial that 
the governors were unable to reconcile the differences.24 
In October the San Francisco Board of Supervisors adopted the Marvin 
Lewis resolution calling for the immediate construction of a southern 
crossing. This was the first ime offlcial San Francisco declared itself about 
the location of the next bridge. Lewis began to couple support for a 
southern crossing with a call to action on JANB's proposed regional rapid 
transit system. San Francisco political and technical leaders argued that 
the combined projects would facilitate the aspirations ofdowntown finan- 
cial and merchant capital. An alliance of downtown interests and orga- 
nized labor could, as well, be cemented. Lewis and several downtown 
financiers and merchants soon emerged as leading activists in the regional 
rapid transit movement that would eventually build BART. 25 
In November CTBA declared that its policy would be to blaild both 
bridges. DPW was to proceed with plans and right-of-way cquisition for 
both structures. DPW Director Charles Purcell, chief engineer on the 
original Bay Bridge project, announced he would appoint a special Bay 
Toll Crossings Division to recommend which bridge ought to be built 
first. 26 
In November 1948, Ralph Tudor, chief engineer for the Bay Toll Cross- 
ings Division, recommended building the parallel bridge first. He pointed 
out that traffic and revenue studies done by Coverdale and Colpitts aid 
that the parallel bridge should have priority because more than eighty 
percent of the vehicles crossing the existing bridge would be served by it, 
while only twenty percent would be attracted to a southern crossing.27 
The united front in San Francisco in support of a southern crossing now 
began to crumble, as the downtown business community switched its 
allegiance to the parallel bridge. In February 1949, the executive commit- 
tee of BAC declared for a parallel bridge and notified the governor and 
CTBA of its stand. Official San Francisco was lePc with few friends: the San 
Francisco Labor Council and the newspapers emained loyal. Even these 
23. San Francisco Bay Area Council Transportation a d Traffic Committee, A Report on 
Additional Crossings of San Francisco Bay, 1947, n.p. 
24. San Francisco Chronicle, September 12, 1947; San Francisco Examiner, September 
12, 1947, Oakland Tnbune, September 20, 1947. 
25. San Francisco Chronicle, October 7, 1947; S. Adler, The Political Economy of Tran- 
sit in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1963 (Washington, D.C: United States Department 
ofTransportation, 1980). 
26. San Francisco Examiner, November 11, 1947. 
27. SBTC, A Report to Department of Public Works on Additional Toll Crossings of San 
Francisco Bay. 
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friends were divided, though. They favored a southern location but dif- 
fered as to exactly where the bridge termini should be. 28 
There seem to be two reasons why the major business organizations 
changed their minds on the bridge location issue. The more important 
was that they were never really committed to a southern location. The 
crucial aspects were the transcontinental rains and a downtown passen- 
ger terminal. Only a southern crossing could accommodate rains, so the 
business community supported a southern crossing. When it became 
clear there weren't going to be any railroad passengers coming directly 
downtown, the business groups looked to other short-range alternatives 
that would increase downtown reception capacity. A parallel bridge ap- 
peared more appropriate for this. The other reason was that it looked as if 
a parallel bridge was going to be built anyway. This was what the state 
wanted to do; the bridge was a local matter. The military engineers had 
already said there wasn't a need for another bridge from a national defense 
standpoint. Moreover, downtown groups and the BAC Committee be- 
lieved that construction of an underwater transit ube was a very long- 
term, uncertain prospect, given the cost and current ransit dynamics. If 
additional freeways were necessary to avoid congestion caused by the 
increased number of motor vehicles in central San Francisco, then, the 
business groups thought, these ought o be built. 
A San Francisco Chronicle writer thought he had found some allies for 
offlcial San Francisco's cause when the United States House of Representa- 
tives Armed Services Committee chairman made correspondence b tween 
himselfand the secretary ofthe navy public. Included was a warningfrom a 
navy vice-admiral that the parallel bridge "violated the fundamental strate- 
gic principle of dispersion." The Chronicle reporter felt the navy was po- 
litely trying to tell CTBA to give up the parallel bridge. This message was 
lost, however, on the California Toll Bridge Authority. A few days later it 
voted unanimously toconstruct aparallel crossing of San Francisco Bay.29 
The parties then shifted to Washington, D.C., where the Bay Area 
would do battle in Congress over legislation sponsored by U.S. Senator 
Knowland, who supported aparallel bridge. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee was the terrain; a parallel bridge would need a permit from 
the military to establish a bridgehead on military property in the middle 
of the bay. The parallel bridge forces were led by Bay Area Council 
executive vice-president and general manager Frank Marsh. 
Hearings were held in the nation's capital during July 1949. Parallel 
bridge supporters tried to convince the senators that this was a strictly 
28. San Francisco Examiner, December 4, 1947, December 17, 1947; San Francisco 
Chronicle, December 6, 1947, March 5, 1949; Oakland Tribune, December 18, 1947, 
November 25, 1948, December 12, 1948; Oakland Post-Enquirer, February 16, 1949; Bay 
Region Business, March 17, 1949, March 24, 1949. 
29. San Francisco Chronicle, March 21, 1949; San Francisco Examiner, March 24, 1949. 
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local issue. Since federal money was not involved, Congress hould let 
California t ke care of its own location decisions. BAC told the Senate 
Committee that the fight against he parallel bridge and for the southern 
crossing was a "self-interested" one by people who wanted to see their 
property values in the southern part of San Francisco and down the 
peninsula increased. BAC declared that the general interest in the relief 
of congestion on the existing bridge must take precedence over any "pro- 
motional" projects. The executive vice-president of the San Francisco 
Chamber of Commerce said that obviously the major business groups in 
his city that supported the parallel bridge would not be doing so if it 
would harm their downtown investments. Engineer Ralph Tudor stressed 
the folly in abandoning the Bridge Railway; who would ever finance con- 
struction of an enormously expensive tube? This would result if the paral- 
lel bridge were blocked and the southern crossing built, because the Bay 
Area would still be forced to increase Bay Bridge motor vehicle capacity. 
Then it was San Francisco Mayor Robinson's turn.30 
According to the Oakland Tribt4ne7 "Mayor Elmer E. Robinson of San 
Francisco . . . pulled out all the stops from fear to patriotism in an effort 
to transfer from California to the federal government sole judgment in 
locating asecond crossing of the Bay.''3l Robinson asked the committee:32 
Can you envision an emergency happening on the San Francisco penin- 
sula? Can you imagine more than a million and a half human beings 
trying to jam themselves, their babies and their baby carriages, their 
birds and their cats and their dogs, their automobiles and on foot, the 
lame and the halt and the blind, trying to force themselves through a
bottleneck in conflict with the military trying to get across this bottle- 
neck to do a job of national defense? Can you envision that scene? That is 
not what we want in any part of this Nation of ours. That is not what we 
want in California. That is not what we want in San Francisco; and the 
people out there, I assure you . . . are speaking by the thousands and 
hundreds of thousands . 
Senator Knowland intervened here to ask a question: <'Mr. Mayor . . . 
you are not contending, are you, that in the event of such a catastrophe 
that you mention, that the people from Palo Alto on up would all normally 
flow into. . . San Francisco when there is a great land connection." 
Mayor Robinson responded: 
I will answer you in this way, Senator Knowland. Ifyou can tell me 
where the enemy is going to strike, Iwill tell you where the people will 
flee. When evacuation comes, they run away from the bullets, not to- 
wards them, and if the enemy comes from the South or strikes at the 
South, which he may logically do down in this area, and if he comes up 
that way, they are going to run to the bottleneck. 
30. San Francisco Chronicle, July 3, 1949; Oakland Tribune, July 7, 1949. 
31. Oakland Tribune, July 8, 1949. 
32. United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings: Easementfor Con- 
struction of Toll Crossing of San Franctsco Bay (July 8, 1949), 96-g9. 
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A few weeks later San Francisco was vindicated; Secretary of Defense 
Louis Johnson affirmed the unequivocal opposition ofthe national military 
establishment to a parallel bridge.33 The Senate turned down Knowland s 
bill to grant an easement over federal property after Johnson spoke. The 
Oakland Trxbune editorialized a call to continue the fight for a parallel 
bridge, adding, "The unsubstantiated statement of a 'military preference' 
is being used in an effort o prohibit consideration ofthe crossing problem 
from the only proper standpoint, the best interests of the people who 
must cross the Bay."34 
By the end of 1949 the bridge controversy had produced a stalemate. 
The parallel bridge was apparently blocked. However, there were as yet 
no means available to build a southern crossing. BAC went back to work 
to find an acceptable regional program. 
The perils of consensus-building (1949-1953). In October 1949, the 
Bay Area Council recommended a forty-five million dollar program to 
improve the Bay Bridge and build additional approaches. Ralph Tudor 
approved, agreeing that the improvements would provide some tempo- 
rary relief and improve safety on the existing structure. BAC followed this 
minimum program ayear later with a Master Plan of Bay Toll Crossings, 
which included northern and southern bridges across the bay (though not 
in the same locations as current proposals). BAC patiently worked to unite 
the region behind its short-term and long-term plans, eventually evercom- 
ing Mayor Robinson's opposition, which was based on a threat he per- 
ceived to the financial viability of the southern crossing. Alameda Senator 
Breed then introduced legislation during the 1951 session to accomplish 
the improvement program.35 
The Breed bill authorized CTBA to continue to collect tolls to finance 
construction of additional approaches and improvements to the Bay 
Bridge. The amount of money spent on the additions was to be the same 
on both sides of the bay. In addition, the bill authorized studies to bring 
plans for the southern crossing up to par with the work already done by 
DPW on the parallel bridge.36 However, as the Breed bill wound its way 
through the Senate, a new element was interjected into the Bay Area 
bridge question. The field of competition broadened as senators from the 
other northern California counties, concerned about he relation of bridge 
project financing to the state highway fund, decided it was time the Bay 
Area settled an old debt. 
33. San Franctsco Chronicle, July 22, 1949. 
34. Oakland Tribune, July 22, 1949, editorial. 
35. San Francisco Examiner, November 1, 1949; San Francisco Chronicle, November 1, 
1949; SBTC, Alterations and Approaches to the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Brtdge as 
Suggested by San Franctsco Bay Area Council, 1949, n.p; San Francisco Bay Area Council, 
"Chronological History: Additional Crossings of San Francisco Bay," November 2, 1951. In 
Earl Warren Papers, Box 311, Division of Highways-Bridges, 7-12/51. California State Ar- 
chives, Sacramento. 
36. California Senate, Bills, Senate Bill 451, 1951. 
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The original legislation provided that the monies advanced to build the 
approaches be repaid to the state highway system when bridge bonds 
were retired. The Breed bill provided for this repayment. However, 
Senator George Hatfield of Merced County, supported by his associates 
from the northern counties, wanted any new issue of bonds to include 
funds to repay all the money spent to operate, insure, and maintain the 
bridge all these years. Moreover, the Hatfield group wanted the bill to 
provide that such expenses in the future be borne out of tolls rather than 
by state highway monies. The Hatfield contingent wanted highways for 
their constituents; they didn't see any reason why their new road funds 
should be decreased any longer to support Bay Area bridges. 
Senator Breed secured amendments o his bill accommodating Hat- 
field. San Francisco, though, was upset by this turn of events. San Fran- 
cisco Senator O'Gara sought firther amendments eliminating the repay- 
ment of operating, insurance, and maintenance expenses. When these 
failed O Gara appealed to the Assembly to bottle up the bill until more 
hearings could be held. The Assembly went along with O'Gara nd killed 
the Breed bill. San Francisco feared these additional expenses would 
threaten southern crossing financing. BAC went back to work rounding 
up support.37 
Mayor Robinson held a meeting with Oakland Mayor Clifford Rishell, 
the Oakland Chamber of Commerce president, and a few technicians; this 
group worked out a proposal which they planned to take directly to 
CTBA. They were hoping that legislative action would not be necessary so 
that the conflict hat broke out during the 1951 session could be by- 
passed. This strategem failed, however. CTBA refused to proceed in the 
face of opposition from the northern counties. Since San Francisco 
wouldn't accept he demands of the Hatfield group, the state legislature 
refilsed to authorize CTBA action on BAC's proposed additions/improve- 
ments program.38 
It was now three years since the Bay Area Council first proposed fixing 
up the Bay Bridge; the consensus-building program hadn't gotten very 
far. Mayor Robinson decided it was time for bold action. With the support 
of Marvin Lewis, Mayor Robinson announced in late November, 1952, 
that he had "come to the conclusion that the impasse with reference to the 
building of additional Bay crossings must be terminated." The mayor and 
Marvin Lewis now supported "simultaneous" construction of two addi- 
tional bridges, one north and one south of the existing one. San Francisco 
should decide where the terminals would be on its side; the East Bay 
cities should do likewise. Robinson oted the Bridge Authority had al- 
37. CTBA, Transcript of Meeting, November 27, 1951. 
38. CTBA, Transcript of Meeting, November 27, 1951; San Francisco Bay Area Council, 
Memorandum of Meeting with Mayor Elmer Robinson re: San Franctsco-Oakland Bay 
Bridge, August 3, 1951. In Earl Warren Papers, Box 311, Division of Highways-Bridges, 7-
12/51. 
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ready determined that both additional crossings were necessary. He 
stated that he was satisfied there wouldn't be any problem in financing 
construction ofboth projects imultaneously. 39 
The Bay Crossings Committee of East Bay Communities, led by the 
Oakland Chamber of Commerce, applauded this statesmanlike behavior 
by San Francisco's mayor. The committee resolved its approval of the 
simultaneous construction proposal and urged immediate action to imple- 
ment the program. BAC informed the governor of the new initiative.40 
This new-found optimism did not, however, long survive. 
In early December DPW Director Frank Durkee informed Governor 
Warren of a conversation he had had with Mr. John Inglis, of the Blyth 
and Company investment banking firm. In a confidential memo Durkee 
told Warren that "Mr. Inglis volunteered the statement that, in his view, 
there might be considerable difficulty in financing, under existing condi- 
tions, two additional crossings of San Francisco Bay if the crossings were 
to be undertaken simultaneously." Inglis felt that sufEcient revenue bonds 
to finance simultaneous construction could not be absorbed by the money 
markets. Durkee wrote that he didn't know if Inglis' views accurately 
reflected those of other bond houses, but the DPW director eminded the 
governor that, "as you know, Mr. Inglis has been interested in practically 
every issue of revenue bonds heretofore put out by the California Toll 
Bridge Authority.''4l 
Just before Christmas San Mateo County Assemblyman Richard Dolwig, 
a southern crossing champion, conducted ahearing about his new proposal 
for simultaneous construction. State Legislative Auditor Robert Stelmack 
told the hearing that investment houses had stated that revenue bond 
financing for simultaneous construction could not be secured. 42 
Assemblyman Dolwig, however, seized the initiative during the 1953 
state legislative session. He drafted a bill that placed a southern crossing 
at the top of the Bay Area infrastructural agenda, at least as far the state 
was concerned. The 1953 Dolwig Act provided that tolls should be contin- 
ued on the Bay Bridge even after all bonds were paid off, and that all 
surplus revenues accruing therefrom were to be used to finance a south- 
ern crossing of San Francisco Bay. A set of approaches and terminals on 
both sides of the bay were included as parts of the project. CTBA was 
39. Office of the Mayor of San Francisco, Statement of Mayor Elmer E. Robinson, 
Reference Bay Bridges, November 20, 1952. In Earl Warren Papers, Box 311, Division of 
Highways-Bridges, 9-12/52. 
40. Bay Crossing Committee of East Bay Communities. Resolution, November 26, 1952. 
In Earl Warren Papers. Box 311, Division of Highways-Bridges, 9-12/52; San Francisco Bay 
Area Council, Frank March Memorandum to the San Francisco Bay Area Council. Decem- 
ber 3, 1952. In Earl Warren Papers, Box 311, Division of Highways-Bridges, 9-12/52. 
41. F. Durkee, Memorandum to Earl Warren. December 3, 1952. In Earl Warren 
Papers. Box 311, Division of Highways-Bridges, 9-12/52. 
42. B. Booker, Report to J . Fleming on Meetings of State Assembly Subcommittee on Bay 
Area Problems . December 22, 1952. In Earl Warren Papers. Box 311, Division of Highways- 
Bridges, 9-12/52. 
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instructed to take all necessary steps including securing necessary federal 
legislation and permits to build the southern crossing. Dolwig was sure to 
include the conditions requested by Senator Hatfield and his associates: 
the state highway fund would be repaid for historic Bay Bridge xpenses, 
including maintenance, insurance, and operating costs; and all such fiature 
costs would be paid from tolls.43 
The state legislature had finally resolved the controversy, ina manner 
that reflected the strength of the alliance Dolwig had been able to con- 
struct. However, as in 1949, a battle had been won, but the war was not 
yet over. Oakland leaders felt betrayed by their San Francisco counter- 
parts because the San Francisco leadership had abandoned the idea of 
simultaneous construction. Moreover, Oakland still had a few Washing- 
ton, D.C. options available. The national government had to give its 
permission to continue toll collection on the Bay Bridge to help finance 
additional construction. Senator William Knowland was said to be seeking 
an amendment to the necessary federal legislation that would would guar- 
antee building a parallel bridge after the southern crossing was finished. 
In 1949, when CTBA wanted to build a parallel bridge, Oakland leaders 
told the Congress this was a purely local matter. San Francisco leaders 
now said the same thing. The conflict between the cities, however, was as 
obvious in 1953 as it had been in 1949. The House Public Works Commit- 
tee chairman oted the bitterness; he offered the Bay Area leaders the use 
of his conference room to achieve consensus rather than come before the 
Congress disunited. The chairman pointed out one of the well-known 
rules of legislative procedure: a higher level of government was loathe to 
enter into conflicts at a lower level. It was far preferable that local people 
work out their differences without outside intervention. 
Oakland Mayor Rishell angrily told the House Committee that there 
had already been two agreements with San Francisco, but San Francisco 
had run out on them. Oakland was now supporting an amendment offiered 
by an Alameda County representative that would specify in the federal 
legislation that a parallel bridge be built following the southern crossing. 
The House, however, was obviously reluctant to write something so spe- 
cific when the state legislature had declined to do so.44 Congress passed 
legislation authorizing continued toll collection but refused to include a 
provision mandating parallel bridge construction.45 The next step was a 
permit from the army to cross navigable waters. It looked like smooth 
sailing for the southern crossing. 
The dynamics of political and military cluims: Pare ll (1953-1956). In 
August, 1953, the navy shocked the celebrating southern crossing propo- 
43. California, Statutes, Chapter 1056, 1953. 
44. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Public Works, Hearings, 
June 23, 1953. 
45. United States Congress, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, Public Law 154, Chap- 
ter248, 1953. 
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nents by opposing DPW's request o the army for a permit. The navy gave 
a flat "No' to the West Bay location specified in the Dolwig Act because 
the navy had plans for possible seaplane development in the area. These 
plans were so new and so secret that the Bay Area navy official who made 
public the opposition did not know any of the details. This was a decision 
taken at the top level of the navy command in Washington; the local navy 
people were as surprised as everyone lse. The San Francisco Examiner 
editorially charged that "political" considerations motivated the navy ac- 
tion. Moreover, just as the Tribune had argued that military concerns 
were inappropriately being put forward in 1949, the Examiner now felt 
the navy had gotten out of line:46 
[When] the Navy attempts to grab offa vast expanse of the Bay waters for 
some possible future need, when the Navy springs its demands as a 
complete and patently intentional surprise that prevents city offlcials 
from cross-examining to develop the facts, when the Navy would so 
casually kill a multimillion dollar civilian bridge project, we say the Navy 
has overreached itself. 
San Francisco mobilized to wring concessions for the navy. Under in- 
tense pressure the navy bent sufficiently to allow a modified southern 
crossing project. The bends, however, increased construction costs and 
presented significant engineering difficulties. During 1954, though, DPW 
was able to secure the necessary army permits; the state engineers then 
settled into the detailed design work necessary to develop a financing and 
construction program.47 
Seven years after the Joint Army-Navy Board had proposed it, a south- 
ern crossing was finally at the top of the Bay Area transportation agenda. 
The 1953 Dolwig Act declared the southern crossing to be the next 
transbay transport facility. The crossing was granted exclusive access to 
surplus Bay Bridge revenues, thereby assuring asource of income for the 
project. 
The success of the southern crossing proponents would be extremely 
consequential for the future history of the regional rail rapid transit move- 
ment. In the Joint Army-Navy Board plan the crossing and regional rapid 
transit were complementary elements in a comprehensive solution to Bay 
Area transportation needs. These elements would, however, increasingly 
come into conflict with each other. In addition, the final defeat of the 
parallel bridge changed the character of the Oakland leadership's partici- 
pation in the regional rapid transit movement. Oakland had successfully 
parried San Francisco's thrusts toward regional rapid transit since Marvin 
Lewis seized the initiative in 1948. Such a system appeared to Oakland as 
an obvious effiort to penetrate rapidly growing peripheral reas in the East 
Bay, thereby consolidating downtown San Francisco's leading position 
46. San Francisco Examiner, August 20, 1953, editorial. 
47. SBTC, Progress Report, Southern Crossing, 1954, n.p; San Francisco Examiner, 
August 25, 1953, September 2, 1953; San Francisco Chronicle, August 26, 1953. 
36 * THE PUBLIC HISTORIAN 
and denying the Oakland central business district dominion over its resi- 
dential hinterlands. They now became far more interested in the move- 
ment's progress and possibilities than they previously had been.48 
The signiJicance ofaccess to projectfinance inthe infrastructure plan- 
ning process (1955-1958). In December 1955, Chief Engineer Norman 
C. Raab of the Division of San Francisco Bay Toll Crossings reported on 
the progress of southern crossing work. Raab found the crossing feasible 
from an engineering standpoint, hough difficult. It would also be ex- 
tremely expensive. Based on traffic and earnings projections which did 
not assume either regional rapid transit or changes in the Bay Bridge, 
Raab estimated that $180 million worth of revenue bonds could be sold 
with the toll remaining at the current wenty-five cents. This amount 
would be sufficient o construct only a "minimum" crossing; there 
wouldn't be any approaches to the crossing in San Francisco and only 
minimal approaches inthe East Bay. An increase in the toll to thirty-five 
cents would be necessary to raise the $250 million ecessary to build the 
entire project as outlined in the 1953 Dolwig Act.49 After a decade of 
bitter conflict and with victory seemingly at hand, this was very disheart- 
ening news to San Francisco, San Mateo, and southern Alameda County 
activists. 
In early 1956 representatives from these areas began working on propos- 
als to make the southern crossing project financially viable. They voluntar- 
ily accepted an important constraint: bridge tolls would remain at their 
current wenty-five cent level. By April Dolwig was able to secure sup- 
port from the state legislature for two critical amendments ohis 1953 Act 
which would enable construction of the "minimum" crossing without 
touching the twenty-five cent toll. Moreover, George Burpee, leading 
figure in the consulting firm of Coverdale and Colpitts, said the $180 
million first-stage construction program could definitely be financed with- 
out raising the toll. The minimum southern crossing project hus had the 
blessings of the firm that had been doing financial studies for Bay Area 
bridges ince the first such projects. Dolwig voiced great optimism that no 
more obstacles appeared in the way. CTBA was ready to proceed with a 
bond issue.50 
The path of the rail rapid transit movement, however, now began to 
intersect that of the southern crossing. The Optimum Plan recommended 
by the consultants o the Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission (BARTC), 
published in January 1956, called for the construction ofan extensive rail 
rapid transit system in the East and West Bays, and an underwater tube 
connecting the San Francisco and Oakland central business districts. The 
48. S. Adler, The Political Economy of Transit in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1963 . 
49. SBTC, Report to the Department of Public Works on the Southern Crossing of San 
Francisco Bay, 1955, n.p. 
50. San Francisco Chronicle, March 3, 1956, San Francisco Examiner, April 3, 1956; 
California, Statutes, Chapter 67, First Extraordinary Session, 1956. 
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tube was the key element cementing an alliance of the two downtowns. It
would allow East Bay trains to converge in central Oakland before crossing 
the bay without seriously extending travel time to downtown San Fran- 
cisco. This design would enable San Francisco and Oakland to co-exist 
peacefully, jointly pursuing their aspirations in the East Bay. Moreover, 
the consultants argued that the combination ofa tube and a reconstructed 
Bay Bridge which the tube would make possiblc would eliminate the 
need for a southern crossing for at least fifteen years. The transit movement 
leadership began to express interest in the surplus Bay Bridge toll revenues 
currerstly reserved for the southern crossing. 51 
In a March 1956 news story, the San Francisco Chronic1 quoted Bay 
Area Rapid Transit Commission Chairman Alan Browne as calling for 
postponement ofthe southern crossing because the crossing might jeopar- 
dize the regional rapid transit plan. Browne pointed to the suggestion 
made by Stanford Research Institute for using bridge tolls for transit. He 
also noted the Optimum Plan would make a southern crossing unneces- 
sary for the time being.52 
A few days later the Chronicle began to reconsider its historic support 
for an additional motor vehicle facility. An editorial noted Alan Browne's 
position that both a southern crossing and rapid transit were not finan- 
cially possible. Browne was quoted as arguing that there were "financial 
relationships between the. . . rapid transit plan and the. . . crossing 
plan that tend to make them mutually exclusive." The Chronicle took 
special notice of Browne's comment hat he didn't "think we should risk 
everything for one more crossing of the Bay. . . . What is more important 
for the future of the area, moving cars or people? I think moving people is 
more important."53 
Legislation sponsored by BARTC was introduced at the state capitol 
which would exempt a rapid transit ube from the prohibition on construc- 
tion of a bay crossing within ten miles of an existing toll bridge on which 
bonds were still outstanding. San Francisco fficials responded to the 
measure with extreme ambivalencea asdid Richard Dolwig. San Frarlcis- 
cans worried that support for the tube at this time would jeopardize the 
southern crossing. Dolwig was similarly concerned. However, San Fran- 
cisco also wanted regional rapid transit. After lengthy and agonizing dis- 
cussions, official San Francisco adopted the position that it would support 
legislation exempting a transit ube from the ten-mile prohibition only if 
investment bankers gave assurances this would not jeopardize southern 
crossing financing. Mayor George Christopher pointed ollt that the bridge 
was still the city's top transportation priority.54 
Dolwig announced that he had received such assurances from the in- 
S1. S. Adler, The Political Economy of Transitin the San Francisco BayArea, 1945-1963 .
52. San Francisco Chrontcle, March 16, 1956. 
53. San Francisco Chronicle, March 19, 1956, editorial. 
54. San Francisco Chronicle, March 13, 1956, March 17, 1956. 
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vestment community shortly therealter, that there wouldn't be any con- 
flict. The investment people were primarily concerned that the legislation 
enabling transit ube construction be passed before the crossing was fi- 
nanced, so that no changes would be made in midstream. These assur- 
ances were apparently sufficient for Dolwig and San Francisco; the transit 
bill was passed at the end of April, just after Dolwig's own amendments o
the southeIn crossing legislation were enacted. 55 
However, in December 1956, CTBA was informed by its financial con- 
sultants, Smith, Barney and Company, that revenue bonds for a minimum 
southern crossing project secured by a twenty-five cent toll would not be 
saleable in the money markets at that time. Smith, Barney concluded that 
"the revenue bond financing necessary to finance its [minimum southern 
crossing] construction would not comply with all of the generally accepted 
investment standards for such securities and. . . must, therefore, be 
considered marginal s to financial feasibility."56 
This was, of course, an interesting and consequential pronouncement. 
George Burpee of Coverdale and Colpitts had said just eight months 
previously that the minimum crossing project was financially feasible. The 
critical role of members of the financial community in the public works 
planning process eems particularly evident at this point. Bank of America 
and Blyth and Company were the leading commercial nd investment 
banking firms in the region. They had always been closely involved with 
CTBA financing efforts. Alan Browne, chairman of the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit Commission, was a Bank of America vice-president incharge of 
municipal bonds. Arthur Dolan, another leading BARTC member, was an 
official in the investment banking firm of Blyth and Company. Both men 
were underwater tube supporters. Smith, Barney and Company would 
serve as financial advisors to the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. These 
representatives of the San Francisco financial district were expressing 
their preference for transit rather than another bridge crossing in a most 
effiective manner, relHecting their general as well as place-specific interest 
in the benefits the proposed owntown/radial r il rapid transit system 
would confer.57 
Financial access had serious consequences for downtown San Fran- 
cisco, however. Having lost a project hey had fought long and hard to 
secure, the peninsula counties of San Mateo and Santa Clara severed their 
ties to the regional transit movement. Santa Clara refused even to join the 
Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD) created by the state legislature 
in 1957. Exercising an option included in the district-creation law at its 
insistence, San Mateo withdrew afew years later. When San Mateo with- 
drew, Marin County was forced to join the exodus, since the property 
55. San Francisco Chronicle, March 15, 1956; California, Statutes, Chapter 40, First 
Extraordinary Session, 1956. 
56. CTBA, Transcript of Meeting, December 12, 1956. 
57. S. Adler, The Political Economy of Transit in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945-1963 . 
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values of the shrunken district would not be able to support the construc- 
tion of an expensive Golden Gate crossing. A severely truncated BART 
system limped onto the ballot in 1962, after barely surviving another 
challenge in Contra Costa County. 
Just as Oakland had argued before the defeat of the parallel bridge, 
local coalitions in the peninsula counties opposed the regional transit 
project as an instance of the imperial aspirations of downtown San Fran- 
cisco. San Mateo and Santa Clara sought transport infrastructure that 
would facilitate their aspirations for autonomous economic development. 
On their behalf, as well as that of southern Alameda County, during the 
same 1957 session the legislature appropriated money for studies leading 
to plans and a bond issue to at least double the capacity of the existing San 
Mateo-Hayward Bridge, seventeen miles south of the Bay Bridge. San 
Mateo and Santa Clara would each create their own transit districts as 
well.58 
Bay Toll Crossings Division Engineer Norman Raab was now directed 
to study the reconstruction fthe Bay Bridge. His work was financed with 
a $50,000 emergency appropriation made possible by the state legislature. 
The legislators noted CTBA must be in a position to commence reconstruc- 
tion work without delay if and when Key Systems trains, which had been 
running across the Bridge Railway since 1939, were abandoned. Key 
System was currently before the California Public Utilities Commission 
seeking permission to substitute buses for trains on its transbay routes. 
Raab reported in March 1957 that the Bay Bridge could be reconstructed 
so as to increase its traffic arrying capacity by twenty-five to thirty-five 
percent. Raab proposed paving the Bridge Railways lanes and establishing 
one way traffic on each deck. He estimated the cost of reconstruction at
thirty-five million dollars. Soon thereafter) the Utilities Commission 
granted Key System permission to abandon the Bridge Railway trains and 
substitute buses. In April the state legislature took up a bill enabling 
CTBA to reconstruct the Bay Bridge for general traffic. The bill provided 
that Bay Bridge revenues currently available and available through July 1, 
1961 could be used to finance reconstruction.59 
In early April 1958, DPW reported to CTBA that investment bankers 
had indicated once again that the southern crossing was not a safe and 
attractive investment for private capital. DPW recommended that con- 
struction was neither feasible nor in the public interest. CTBA agreed.60 
Just a few weeks later the Bay Area Rapid Transit District requested 
CTBA to consider building a rapid transit ube as its next bay crossing, 
58. S. Adler, The Political Economy of Transit in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945- 
1963, California, Statutes, Chapter 2416, 1957. 
59. SBTC, Reconstr7setion f the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, 1957, n.p; Califor- 
nia Public Utilities Commission, Decisions, Number 54669, 1957; California, Senate, Bills, 
Senate Bill 1643, 1957. 
60. CTBA, Transcript of Meeting, April 3, 1958. 
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and to use surplus Bay Bridge toll revenues to finance its construction. 
In 1959 the state legislature authorized CTBA to do so. 
Conclusion 
In his foreword to Robert Moses' book about public works, Raymond 
Moley wrote: 
From the pyramids of Egypt, to the rebuilding of Rome after Nero's fire, 
to the creation of the great medieval cathedrals and the reconstruction of 
Paris by Baron Haussmann, all great public works have been somehow 
associated with autocratic power. For pure democracy has neither the 
imagination, nor the energy, nor the disciplined mentality to create 
major improvements.62 
Regardless ofwhat he meant by "pure democracy '2 Moley is clearly wrong 
regarding its incapacities. Imagination, energy, and a disciplined mental- 
ity have never been lacking. Rather, the abundance of these factors, 
generated by the structural fact of spatial competition and sustained by 
the responsiveness of legislative bodies to local investor coalitions, pro- 
duces a strong tendency to stalemate the construction oflarge-scale infra- 
structure projects. The Bay Area case illuminates ways in which stalemate 
may at least partially be transcended. 
The Bay Area Council abored mightily to build consensus regarding 
transport investment in the region. BAC claimed to articulate the inter- 
ests of the region as a whole regarding infrastructure concerns. Yet com- 
petitive localities repeatedly undermined BAC efforts to unite the region 
behind an investment program. When BAC sought o assemble apackage 
of projects designed to appeal to numerous competitors, the perception 
that the package included elements that would concentrate benefits dis- 
rupted consensus. Local coalitions continuously pursued governmental 
opportunities that would defend and advance their individual interests 
outside the BAC-organized consensus-building process. 
However, while BAC failed to build consensus disaggregation was an 
essential aspect of overcoming the stalemate. The state legislature always 
respectful of local autonomy, permitted the peninsula counties to with- 
draw from the regional rapid transit project and supported their quest for 
locally oriented transport facilities. As a result, a variety of smaller-scale 
projects serving several subregional liances became feasible. 
At no point did political or military priority claims ilence opposition. 
Whether argued by local project sponsors or military branches, all such 
claims on behalf of particular projects were immediately involved in the 
location conflict, and, therefore, suspect. Since the early history of this 
61. CTBA, Transcript of Meeting, April 30, 1958. 
62. R. Moley, "Foreword," in R. Moses, Public Works: A Dangerous Trade (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1970), xi. 
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controversy coincided with the most intense period of cold war hostility as 
well as the Korean War, though, political and military considerations 
carried weight. San Francisco and Oakland both asserted such claims to 
defend against each other's initiatives. However, since large-scale unem- 
ployment was not an issue, nor was the country immediately subject o 
threat from without, political and military priority claims could not them- 
selves provide a way of overcoming stalemate. 
Access to project finance was decisive. However, even the financial 
gatekeepers were constrained by competing local coalitions. The Califor- 
nia Toll Bridge Authority sought o build only those motor vehicle facili- 
ties they believed would be profitable, and to eschew investment in tran- 
sit. The financiers leading the regional rapid transit movement were, 
however, able to steer the CTBA in the direction the transit activists 
wished to go. The financial disabilities of transit did force the movement 
to seek governmental subsidy, thereby opening up the project decision 
process to opponents and to popular electoral participation. This resulted 
in a much scaled-down project and relatively favorable terms for orga- 
nized transit labor during the transition from a private to a governmental 
industry. 
